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McGinn: Constitutional Law

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

ZAL v. STEPPE: NINTH CIRCUIT
APPROVAL OF AN IN LIMINE BAN OF
SPECIFIC WORDS
I. INTRODUCTION
In Zal v. Steppe,l the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit held that, in an abortion clinic criminal trespass case, a defense attorney who violated an in limine ban of
specific words related to abortion could be held in contempt
without violating the First Amendment. 2 Thus, the court determined that the in limine ban of 50 specific words and phrases s
was constitutionally sound. 4 Additionally, the court determined
that the in limine ban did not violate the defendants' Sixthli and
Fourteenth AmendmentS rights to counsel, trial by jury, and due
process of law. 7
The rationale for the Ninth Circuit's holding was two-fold.
To establish the extent of an attorney's First Amendment rights
in the courtroom, the court cited dicta from the United States
Supreme Court case Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada 8 stating
1. Zal v. Steppe, 968 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1992) (per Farris, J.; Trott, J., concurring;
and Noonan, J., concurring in the result in part, dissenting in part), cert. denied, 121 L.
Ed. 2d 582 (1992).
2. [d. at 929. See infra note 33 for full text of the first amendment.
3. See infra note 64 for a definition of in limine. See infra note 21 for words and
phrases excluded. Additionally, the trial court banned the use of the defenses of necessity, defense ,of others, mistake of fact, and compliance with international laws, treaties
or declarations. Zal, 968 F.2d at 925.
4. [d. at 928.
5. See infra note 34 for full text of the sixth amendment.
6. See infra note 35 for full text of the fourteenth amendment.
7. Zal, 968 F.2d at 929-30.
8. 111 S. Ct. 2720 (1991). See infra note 139 for a discussion of Gentile.
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that whatever free speech rights an attorney has in the courtroom are extremely circumscribed. 9 To support its conclusion
that attorneys could not disobey court orders, the court relied on
Sacher v. United States lO which explained that the only right an
attorney has when faced with an adverse ruling is to respectfully
preserve the point for appeal. l l The Ninth Circuit thus held that
an attorney cannot use the First Amendment as a "shield" to
disobey a court order.12
Zal set an important precedent. It is the first reported case
in any jurisdiction where an in limine ban of more than one
word or phrase has been granted. 13 Because the Ninth Circuit
determined that attorneys' rights in the courtroom are circumscribed, the court was able to avoid performing a thorough constitutional analysis of the ban. I4 Consequently, the court condoned the use of word-bans without providing any guidelines to
assist lower court judges in determining whether to grant
them, 111 and effectively sanctioned unlimited judicial discretion
to censor attorney speech in the courtroom.16

II. FACTS
Attorney Cyrus Zal, former general counsel for the antiabortion group Operation Rescue,I7 represented seven anti-abortion activists who were charged with criminal trespass. I8 The ac9. Zal. 968 F.2d at 928.
10. 343 U.S. 1 (1952). See infra note 168 for a discussion of Sacher.
11. Zal. 968 F.2d at 928.
12. Id. at 929.
13. See infra notes 85-101 and acc,ompanying text for a discussion of in limine bans
of words and phrases.
14. See Zal. 968 F.2d at 927-29.
15. See infra notes 295-304 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 306-19 and accompanying text.
17. Associated Press. Ruling Against Lawyer Upheld. LA TIMES, July 2. 1992 at

B8.
18. Criminal Trespass is covered by CAL, PENAL CODE § 602(j) (Deering 1986). which
states in pertinent part:
[E]very person who willfully commits a trespass by any of the
following is guilty of a misdemeanor.... Entering any lands.
whether unenclosed or enclosed by fence. for the purpose of
injuring any property or property rights or with the intention
of interfering with. obstructing, or injuring any lawful business
or occupation carried on by the owner of the land. the owner's
agent or by the person in lawful possession.
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tivists had blocked the doors of an abortion clinic in La Mesa,
California, by physically placing themselves between the clinic
doors and clients attempting to enter.19
Before trial commenced, Municipal Court Judge Larrie
Brainard granted the prosecutor's in limine motion, excluding
the defenses of necessity, defense of others, compliance with international law, treaties or declarations, and mistake of fact.20
The court also granted the prosecutor's separate motion in
limine to exclude any mention or utterance of 50 specific words
and phrases 21 such as abortion, fetus, unborn, "death mill" and
19. The case was People v. Carla Jean Bultsma, Case No. CI01464, Municipal Court
of California, County of San Diego, EI Cajon Municipal District, 1990. Opening Brief for
Appellant at 3-4, Zal (No. 91-55579).
20. Zal v. Steppe, 968 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 121 L. Ed. 2d 582
(1992).
21. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Emergency Motion under
Circuit Rule 27-3 at Exhibit 1 and Exhibit 2, Zal (No. 91-55579). The prosecution's in
limine motion was actually in the form of two separate lists. The first list (Exhibit 1)
read:
WORDS TO EXCLUDE IN LIMINE BEFORE TRIAL
(1) KILL
(2) KILLER
(3) BABY KILLER(S)
(4) KILLING CENTERS
(5) MURDER and MURDERER
(6) FETUS
(7) DEATHSCORT (FOR ESCORT PERSONNEL)
(8) GENOCIDE
(9) HOLOCAUST
(10) ABORTUARY
(11) ABORTION
(12) ANY REFERENCE TO GOD OR DEITY
(13) "RELIGIOUS BELIEFS" IN ANY MANNER OR FORM
(14) HITLER
(15) NAZI or NAZISM
(16) MANSLAUGHTER and/or CHILDSLAUGHTER
(17) "RIGHTS OF THE UNBORN"
(18) DEATH MILL
(19) RESCUER
(20) ANY WORD WHICH IS INCORPORATED IN NUMERAL (7) LISTED
ABOVE.
The second list (EXHIBIT 2) read:
Pursuant to California Evidence Code sections 210 and 352,
there should be no reference to the following items:
... (7) No reference to why the defendant(s) were present if
it includes religious beliefs or opinions on abortion, or any of
the following: KILL, MURDER, SLAUGHTER, SLAYING,
SLAY, DESTROY, DESTRUCTION, EXTERMINATION,
BLOODLETTING, SACRIFICE, MARTYRDOM, EXECU-
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"baby killer."22
At the beginning of trial, the trial court judge participated
in voir dire of the jury.28 He asked prospective jurors if their
feelings on abortion would prevent them from being impartial. 24
During the January 1990 trial, Zal asked witnesses a total of
thirteen questions which used one or more of the excluded words
and phrases. 211 Zal also asked witnesses seven questions which
TION, HOMICIDE, GENOCIDE, FRATRICIDE, SORORICIDE, PARRICIDE, INFANTICIDE, ABORTICIDE, FETICIDE, BUTCHER, BUTCHERY, CARNAGE, MASSACRE,
BLOODBATH, DECIMATION, MASS DESTRUCTION,
CAIN, ASSASSIN, CUTTHROAT, THUG, GORILLA, NAZI,
ERADICATION, MONSTER or MONSTROSITY.
The court granted the prosecution's in limine motion with the exception of references to "God or Deity" and "[r]eligious beliefs in any manner or form." Opening Brief
for Appellant at 5, Zal (No. 91-55579). Although the Ninth Circuit determined that the
words and phrases were "linked to the excluded defenses," Zal, 968 F.2d at 925, both Zal
and the prosecuting attorney inferred that the words and the defenses were excluded in
separate motions. See Opening Brief for Appellant at 5, Zal (No. 91-55579); Brief of
Appellee at 5, Zal (91-55579). Zal's opening brief states "[t]he trial court granted the
prosecutor's motion to preclude the above listed defenses and to exclude all evidence
pertaining thereto during any phase of the trial." Opening Brief for Appellant at 5, Zal
(No. 91-55579). "The prosecutor also submitted to the court before trial two lists containing ... words and phrases to exclude in limine" (emphasis added). [d. Prosecuting
attorney Cecil Steppe's opening brief states "[t]he trial court's order dealt with evidence,
defenses, and inflammatory words before a jury." Brief of Appellee at 5, Zal (91-55579)
(emphasis added).
22. See supra note 21 for word list.
23. Opening Brief for Appellant at 5, Zal (91-55579).
24. [d.
25. Zal, 968 F.2d at 925-26. The questions were:
- Can't we ask anything about baby-killing Your Honor?
- Is the unborn baby a life you have sworn to protect?
- Did you feel any obligation to protect the children who would be killed that day?
- Officer, were you an unborn baby at some time in your life?
- Wasn't the safety corridor the place where babies were taken to be killed?
- How long have you been in the baby-killing business?
- Does the oath you have taken to tell the truth mean anything to someone who is in
the baby killing business?
- What's done with the bodies of the babies killed by your employer?
- Are you concerned that you may some day be charged with murder for your role in
the abortion holocaust?
- Do you think you will always protect the baby-killers?
- Are those convictions worth the lives of unborn babies?
- Now, is it from your own personal knowledge that you know two babies were saved
from abortions that day?
- Isn't that a poster of an unborn child sucking its thumb?
(emphasis added to words on the "banned" list).
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did not contain any of the banned words, but contained similar
words and phrases. 26 Zal was held in criminal contempt27 a total
of 20 times 26 for violating the court's in limine orders 29 and sentenced to 290 days in jail. 30
Zal unsuccessfully appealed in both the federal district
court and California state courts. 31 Zal then filed a petition for
26. [d. These questions were:
- Is that the place where they empty the contents of a woman's uterus?
- Are you familiar with those facilities where two persons go in and only one person
comes out alive?
- What time do the first victims arrive?
- How do you feel about making a living off the blood of babies?
- Are your paychecks bloodstained?
- Where do the bodies go?
- Did you know what babies they were referring to?
- Do you know the time, date and place where a life was going to be taken?
- What do you do when your oath to protect life conflicts with your duties?
- Do you think perhaps the dog knew his duty to protect life better than the police
officers?
27. Criminal contempt is covered by CAL. PENAL CODE § 166 (Deering 1986). Section
166 provides in pertinent part that willful disobedience of any process or order lawfully
issued by any court will result in contempt of court, a misdemeanor. [d.
28. Zal, 968 F.2d at 926. Sometimes Zal was cited only once for more than one use
of a word or phrase. [d.
29. Order Adjudging Contempt (C101464B, C, E-M):
During in limine motions the Court ruled that the trial would
be restricted to the charge of trespass and that abortion, any
"necessity defense," and "the rights of the unborn" would not
be issues presented to the jury. Counsel and the defendants
were specifically instructed not to attempt to improperly influence or proselytize the jury on the above issues .... The Court
allowed attorney Cyrus Zal the opportunity to explain his actions after each citation for contempt. Mr. Zal stated that he
'welcomed' said citations and had incurred same intentionally
to further his cause. The court finds each act of contempt was
done intentionally to improperly influence and proselytize the
jury in direct contravention of court orders.
30. Opening Brief for Appellant at 3, Zal (No. 91-55579).
31. [d. at 3-4. Cyrus Zal filed petitions for writ of habeas corpu~ in the Superior
Court of California, San Diego County, the Court of Appeal of the State of California,
and a petition for hearing and stay of proceedings in the California Supreme Court. Each
petition was denied. Zal additionally filed petitions for habeas corpus/prohibition/mandamus and for bail in the Superior Court of California, County of San Diego on January
18, 1991. The Court granted bail, but denied the petition. Subsequently on February 8,
1991, Zal filed petitions for habeas corpus/prohibition/mandamus arid for bail to remain
in force in the California Court of Appeal, Fourth District. The court granted the order
keeping bail in force, but denied the petition. On March 28, 1991, Zal filed a petition for
review and for bail to remain in force with the California Supreme Court. The petition
was denied. Turning to the Federal Courts, Zal filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California. This petition
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writ of habeas corpus with the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit. 82 Zal's habeas corpus petition claimed that
the trial court's in limine order violated the following: his First
Amendment88 free speech rights, his clients' Sixth8• and Fourteenth Amendment811 rights, and the Fifth88 and Fourteenth
Amendment rights87 of the unborn.
Although Zal had completed his sentence, the Ninth Circuit
was also denied. [d.
32. [d.
33. [d. The first amendment provides that "[c]ongress shall make no law respecting

an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and
to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
34. Opening Brief for Appellant at 3, Zal (No. 91-55579) (rights to trial by jury and
assistance of counsel). The sixth amendment provides that:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State
and district wherein the crime shall have been committed,
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law,
and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation;
to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
35. Opening Brief for Appellant at 3, Zal (No. 91-55579) (right to due process). The
fourteenth amendment provides that:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
36. Opening Brief for Appellant at 3, Zal (No. 91-55579) (right to life). The fifth
amendment provides that:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a
Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces,
or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor
be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
37. Opening Brief for Appellant at 3-4, Zal (No. 91-55579) (rights to life and equal
protection). See supra note 35 for full text of the fourteenth amendment.
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Court of Appeals granted review. The court explained that the
contempt order was· not a moot point because, if allowed to
stand, Zal would potentially face additional sanctions from the
California Bar. 38
III. BACKGROUND

A.

CHALLENGING COURT ORDERS IN CALIFORNIA

Whether a contemnor can challenge a court order after he
has knowingly violated the order varies in different jurisdictions.
In federal courts, and in many state courts, a "collateral bar"
rule is in effect.39 This rule prohibits a court order from being
"collaterally" challenged after it has been violated."o
1.

The Collateral Bar Rule

The collateral bar rule provides that a person cannot challenge a court order after that order has been violated.· 1 The rule
is perhaps best demonstrated by the United States Supreme
Court Case Walker v. City of Birmingham."2 In Walker, the
court upheld an Alabama rule which provided that a constitutional challenge to a court order could only be raised before the
order was· violated."3 The defendants in Walker knowingly disobeyed a temporary injunction that enjoined them from parading without a permit."· After the defendants held a civil rights
demonstration in violation of the injunction, they sought to
challenge the constitutionality of the injunction, arguing that it
was vague and overbroad."1i The Alabama Supreme Court refused to perform a full constitutional analysis of the injunction,
reasoning that it had already been defied."6
The United States Supreme Court admitted that the in38. Zal, 968 F.2d at 926.
39. See Zal v. Steppe, 968 F.2d 924, 927 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 121 L.Ed. 2d
582 (1992).
40. See generally Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967).
41. Id. at 313-14.
42. 388 U.S. 307 (1967).
43. Id. at 313-14.
44. Id. at 309-10.
45. Walker, 388 U.S. at 317.
46.Id.
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junction may have been constitutionally defective, but explained
that the collateral bar rule provided that a constitutional analysis only needed to be performed if the issuing court lacked jurisdiction, or the defendants had violated the injunction unknowingly.'7 As neither of these situations applied to the defendants,
the Court upheld the defendants' contempt citations."8 The
Court relied on its earlier decision in Howat v. Kansas"s to explain that:
An injunction ... must be obeyed ... however
erroneous the action of the court may be .... It is
for the court of first instance to determine the
question of the validity of the law, and until its
decision is reversed for error by orderly review, either by itself or a higher court, its orders based on
its decisions are to be respected, and disobedience
of them is contempt of its lawful authority, to be
punished. 50

At least one lower federal court has applied the collateral
bar rule to prevent abortion protesters from collaterally challenging a temporary restraining order. In New York State NOW
v. Terry/,I the defendants blocked abortion clinic facilities in violation of a restraining order .112 The court refused to allow a
First Amendment challenge to the order because it had already
been violated. liS

2. Berry - The California Rule
California does not follow the collateral bar rule. II" The California Supreme Court case In re Berryllll explained that orders
47. [d. at 311-12.
48. [d. at 321.

49. 258 U.S. 181 (1922).
50. [d. at 189-90.
51. New York State NOW v. Terry, 697 F. Supp. 1324 (S.D. N.Y. 1988).
52. [d. at 1326.
53. [d. at 1334.
54. Zal, 968 F.2d at 927.
55. 436 P.2d 273 (Cal. 1968). The defendants in Berry disobeyed a temporary restraining order which prohibited them from picketing and engaging in other strike activi. ties. [d. at 277-78. They were aware of the restraining order, but believed that it "suffered from constitutional defects which rendered it void," so they decided to continue
strike activities as planned. [d. at 277. After they were held in contempt, they sought to
challenge the order as overbroad. [d. at 282. The County of Sacramento (which had obtained the order against the defendants) argued that the defendants were barred from
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issued without jurisdiction are void. 1I8 Furthermore, in California, if an order is found to be unconstitutional, it will be considered to have been issued without jurisdiction. 1I7 Therefore, in
California, a person affected by a court order has two options: 1I8
(1) comply with the order while seeking a judicial declaration to
its validity, or (2) disobey the order and raise "jurisdictional
contentions" when punished for violation of the order.1I9 A person following the latter route will be vindicated if the court order is found unconstitutiona1. 80
The main difference between the Berry rule and the collateral bar rule is that when the constitutionality of an order is
challenged subsequent to violation, the Berry rule requires a
constitutional analysis81 while the collateral bar rule does not. 82
In comparing Walker with Berry, the California Supreme Court
concluded "[i]n California ... the rule followed is considerably
more consistent with the exercise of First Amendment
freedoms. "83

B.

IN LIMINE ORDERS

1.

Use of In Limine Orders

The in limine 84 order is a procedural device which precludes
opposing counsel from presenting evidence to the jury.811 Its purcollaterally challenging the order because the issuing court had both subject matter and
personal jurisdiction over the defendants when the order was issued. Id. at 279-80. The
California Supreme Court rejected this argument and determined that an order lacked
jurisdiction if it was unconstitutional. Id. at 280. The court accordingly granted the defendants' writ of habeas corpus. Id. at 286.
56. Berry, 436 P.2d at 280.
57.Id.
58. Id. at 281.
59. [d.
60.Id.
61. Berry, 436 P.2d at 279 ("It is well settled that a court is without jurisdiction to
subject a citizen to criminal prosecution for violation of an unconstitutional ... court
order . . . relief is not barred by the failure of petitioners to challenge directly . . . .").
62. Walker, 388 U.S. at 316-17 ("The breadth and vagueness of the injunction itself
would ... unquestionably be subject to substantial constitutional question. But the way
to raise that question was to apply to the Alabama courts to have the injunction modified or dissolved.").
63. Berry, 436 P.2d at 282 (referring to the collateral bar rule).
64. In limine is defined as "[o]n or at the threshold; at the very beginning; preliminarily." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 787 (6th ed. 1990).
65. See generally Canda<;e C. Fetscher, The Motion in limine, A Useful Procedural
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pose is "to avoid the unfairness caused by the presentation of
prejudicial or objectionable evidence to the jury."66 Although
prejudicial evidence is usually the type of evidence sought to be
excluded,67 the scope of the motion includes any kind of evidence that could be excluded at tria1. 68 Additionally, the scope
of the motion encompasses both physical and testamentary evidence. 69 At least one federal court has warned against excluding
broad categories of evidence. 7o
Not specifically authorized by statute,71 the in limine order
is recognized as within the court's inherent power. 72 Violating an
in limine order can result in a charge of contempt of court. 7S
The in limine order is obtained when an attorney makes a
motion in limine requesting the judge to exclude certain items
of the opposing party's evidence. 74 This motion is usually made
prior to trial, but can be made any time before the evidence
sought to be excluded is introduced.7I1 There is no specific form a
motion in limine must take. 76
An in limine motion may request either a "prohibitive-preliminary" order or a "prohibitive:absolute" order." The prohibitive-preliminary order restricts an attorney from presenting the
Device, 35 MONT. L. REV. 362 (1974).
66. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. v. Superior Ct., 245 Cal. Rptr. 873, 884 (1988),
cert. dismissed, Peat, Marwick, Main & Co., 490 U.S. 1086 (1989).
67. Fetscher, supra note 65, at 362.
68. See Peat, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 884 (irrelevant evidence is within the scope of the
motion). See CAL. EVID. CODE § 352 (West 1992) (evidence may be excluded in one of
four ways: (1) danger of undue prejudice; (2) danger of confusing issues; (3) danger of
jury being misled; or (4) danger of undue consumption of time).
69. Ganey v. Doran, 236 Cal. Rptr. 787, 790 (1987).
70. Sperberg v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 519 F.2d 708, 712 (6th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 987 (1975) (in limine order excluded any mention of three related cases,
order was upheld because the attorney did not object to the order at trial, but the appellate judge warned against excluding such broad categories of evidence in the future).
71. Peat, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 884. See also J. Patrick Hazel, The Motion in Limine: A
Texas Proposal, 21 Hous. L. REV. 919, 933 n.3 (1988).
72. Peat, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 884.
73. See supra note 27 for contempt statute.
74. Henry B. Rothblatt & David H. Leroy, The Motion In Limine in Criminal Trials: A Technique for the Pretrial Exclusion of Prejudicial Evidence, 60 Ky. L.J. 611, 613
(1972).
75. 3 BERNARD WITKIN. CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE § 2011 (3d ed. 1986).
76.Id.
77. Rothblatt & Leroy, supra note 74, at 615-16.
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excluded evidence until he or she has gained express permission
from the judge during trial. 78 The prohibitive-absolute order
prohibits counsel from offering the excluded evidence or mentioning it in any way at any time during the triaP9
2.

Use of the In Limine Order to Exclude Entire Defenses

Use of the in limine order to exclude entire defenses is not
uncommon. 80 The most commonly excluded defenses are necessity and duress. 81 In fact, in limine orders excluding the defense
of necessity have been widely accepted in cases similar to Zal's.82
Orders excluding the defenses of mistake of fact 83 and defense of
others84 have also been granted in abortion clinic trespass cases.
3. In Limine Exclusion of Specific Words

Prior to Zal u. Steppe, only one reported case used a motion
in limine to exclude a specific phrase. In Cook u. Philadelphia
Transportation Company,8" the court issued an in limine order
precluding use of the term "Crazy Bar" to identify the property
across the street from where the plaintiff/pedestrian was struck
by a car.86 "Crazy· Bar" was disallowed because there was no
78. [d.
79. [d.

80. Douglas L. Colbert, The Motion in Limine in Politically Sensitive Cases: Si·
lencing the Defendant at Trial, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1283 (1987). The Colbert article
provides an in-depth analysis of the history and use of the motion in limine. It particularly focuses on in limine exclusion of entire defenses. Additionally, the article demonstrates how an in limine motion to exclude over 30 words and phrases was rejected by a
trial court. The Colbert article was cited in Judge Noonan's dissenting and concurring
opinion in Zal to explain the initial development of the motion in limine in criminal
trials. Zal, 968 F.2d at 934.
81. See Colbert, supra note 80, at 1284.
82. See, e.g., Allison v. City of Birmingham, 580 So.2d 1377, 1379 (Ala. Crim. App.
1991), cert. denied, 580 So.2d 1390 (Ala. 1991); People v. Smith, 514 N.E.2d 211, 212 (Ill.
Ct. App. 1987), appeal denied, 520 N.E.2d 391 (Ill. 1988); State v. Rein, 477 N.W.2d 716,
717 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991); City of St. Louis v. Klocker, 637 S.W.2d 174, 175 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1982); State v. Sahr, 470 N.W.2d 185, 187 (N.D. 1991); City of Dayton v. Drake, 590
N.E.2d 319, 320 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990); State v. Clowes, 801 P.2d 789, 791-92 (Or. 1990);
State v. Olsen, 299 N.W.2d 632, 634 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980).
83. Allison, 580 So.2d at 1379.
84. [d. (mistaken belief that the unborn are persons).
85. 199 A.2d 446 (Pa. 1964).
86. [d. at 447.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1993

11

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 8

46

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:35

proof that the plaintiff was intoxicated when hit. 87 The court
reasoned that reference to the "Crazy Bar" would tend to lead
jurors to infer that the plaintiff was intoxicated. 88
Several times, however, attorneys' attempts to exclude
words or phrases in limine have been rejected. In one Eighth
Circuit products liability case,89 a tire manufacturer sought
to exclude the phrases "widow maker," "man killer," "killer
wheel," and "bone breaker."90 The manufacturer claimed that
these terms were prejudicial and inflammatory.91 The manufacturer's motion in limine was denied. 92
In another federal case,93 a defendant filed a motion in
limine to prevent any mention of the word "conspiracy."94 His
in limine motion was denied because the court found that the
plaintiff had a colorable conspiracy claim. 911
Prior to Zal, no reported cases addressed a motion in limine
seeking to exclude a large number of words. However, in the
unreported case United States u. Rosenberg,96 the government
made a motion in limine to exclude at least 31 specific phrases. 97
The prosecuting attorneys did not submit a memorandum of law
or cite any case to support their motion. 98 In contrast, the defense counsel argued that if the motion was granted, it would
prevent his clients from receiving a fair tria1. 99 Additionally, the
defense counsel argued that the motion was a "wholly irregular
... extraordinary and overbroad request made without any
showing as to the irrelevance of the words or matters [the gov87.
88.
89.
90.

[d.
[d.
Hale v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 756 F.2d 1322 (8th Cir. 1985).
[d. at 1333.
91. [d.
92. [d. (no reason for the denial was given).
93. Peuntes v. Sullivan, 425 F.Supp. 249 (W.D. Tex. 1977).
94. [d. at 249.
95. [d. at 253.
96. Crim. No. 84-360 (D.N.J. tiled Feb. 28 1985), aft'd, 806 F.2d 1169 (3d Cir. 1986).
See Colbert, supra note 80, at 1307-09.
97. Notice of Motion at 3-4, Rosenberg (Crim. No. 84-360) (words included terrorist,
revolution, anarchist, combatants, socialism, fascism, urban guerillas). See Colbert,
supra note 80, at 1308 for full list.
98. See Colbert, supra note 80, at 1308.
99. [d.
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ernment] wishes to exclude."loo The motion was denied. lOl

C.

FIRST AMENDMENT SUBSTANTIVE STANDARDS

Governments can regulate speech in two ways: (1) prior restraint, and (2) subsequent punishment. The United States Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment protects
against both forms of regulation. l02 When a person challenges
the First Amendment constitutionality of a government regulation of speech, the courts will generally balance the government's need to regulate against the challenger's right to
speech. lOS However, a court's substantive First Amendment analysis may vary depending on whether the regulation was imposed
prospectively (prior restraint), or after the communication has
occurred (subsequent punishment).104
1.

Prior Restraints on Attorney Speech

The term "prior restraint" is used to describe judicial orders
restricting communications before they occur. 1011 Restraint of
speech prior to its exercise presents a separate issue from regulation and discipline after the fact.l06 In fact, the United States
Supreme Court has determined that "[p]rior restraints on
speech are the most serious and least tolerable infringement on
First Amendment rights."107 Although the term "prior restraint"
100. Defendant's Motion in Opposition to Government's Motion in limine at 1-2,
Rosenberg (Crim. No. 84-360). See Colbert, supra note 80, at 1308.
101. See Colbert, supra note 80, at 1309.
102. See Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 101-102 (1979) ("First
Amendment protection reaches beyond prior restraints .... Whether we view the statute
as a prior restraint or as a penal sanction ... is not dispositive because even the latter
action requires the highest form of state interest to sustain its validity.").
103. See, e.g., Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 32 (1984), cert. denied,
467 U.S. 1230 (1984).
104. See infra note 105 for a definition of prior restraint.
105. MELVILLE NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 4.03 (1984) (the term
"prior restraint" can also be used to describe administrative orders); see also BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1194 (6th ed. 1990) ("A system of prior restraint is any scheme which
gives public officials the power to deny the use of a forum in advance of its actual
expression.").
106. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 557 (1976) ("Cases which deal
with punishment based on contempt, however, deal with problems substantially different
from those raised by prior restraint."). See also State v. Russell, 610 P.2d 1122, 1126
(Kan. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 983 (1980).
107. Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 559.
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has only been applied to out of court utterances, prior restraint
analysis is arguably not limited to that context.108 The court in
In re Halkin 109 suggested that the fact a court order presented
many of the same dangers as a prior restraint was enough to
require "close scrutiny of its impact on protected First Amendment expression. "110
I

The rationale for a separate prior restraint analysis was articulated in Southeastern Promotions Ltd. v. Conrad. III There,
the court stated:
[A] free society prefers to punish the few who
abuse rights of speech after they break the law
than to throttle them and all others beforehand.
It is always difficult to know in advance what an
individual will say, and the line between legitimate and illegitimate speech is often so finely
drawn that the risks of free-wheeling censorship
are formidable. 112

Zal is the first reported case that challenges a restriction of
an attorney's speech in the courtroom as a prior restraint. 11s
Perhaps this is because prior to Zal, judges had not attempted
to regulate the use of certain words in their courtrooms except
by issuing contempt citations after inappropriate communications occurred. 11 • However, courts have previously applied prior
restraint analysis to judicial orders regulating an attorney's extra-judicial speech during pending cases.lUi

When presented with a prior restraint of extra-judicial
speech regarding a pending case, courts have applied several balancing tests. Among tests utilized are the "clear and present
108. But cf. Scott v. Anderson, 405 So.2d 228, 231 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (clear
and present danger test only applies to out of court statements).
109. 598 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (analyzing whether an order that prohibited an
attorney from disclosing information obtained through discovery was constitutionally
deficient).
110. [d. at 186. Additionally, the United States Supreme Court has warned against
.
using the term "prior restraint" as a "talismanic test." Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown,
354 U.S. 436, 441 (1957).
111. 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
112. [d. at 559.
113. Zal, 968 F.2d at 928.
It4. See infra notes 120·28 and accompanying text for an analysis of contempt.
115. See, e.g., Halkin, 598 F.2d at 183·86.
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danger" test,116 and the "substantial likelihood of material
prejudice" test. ll7 These tests balance First Amendment rights
against government interests and require that restrictions are
"narrowly tailored"ll8 to assure that they do not infringe upon
constitutional rights. ll9
2. Subsequent Punishment for Attorneys' Speech - the
Contempt Order

Contempt is generally defined as "an act committed in or
out of the court's presence, that tends to impede, embarrass, or
obstruct the court in the discharge of its duties." 12o When the
contemptuous act is performed in court, it is "direct contempt." 121 A court will issue a civil contempt citation if its primary purpose is to preserve litigant rights. 122 When the court's
primary purpose is to punish, it will issue a criminal contempt
citation. 123
Like prior restraints, contempt citations must be able to
withstand substantive First Amendment analysis. In In re McConnell,124 the United States Supreme Court held that courts
were limited in contempt cases to "the least possible power adequate to the end proposed." l2II Any broader contempt power, the
court explained, "would permit too great inroads on the procedural safeguards of the Bill of Rights." 12e
116. Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375,388 (1962). See infra note 128 for a definition of
the clear and present danger test.
117. See Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 111 S. Ct. 2720, 2745 (1991) ("The regulation of attorneys' speech is limited - it applies only to speech that is substantially likely
to have 'a materially prejudicial effect; it is neutral to points of view ... and it merely
postpones the attorney's comments until after the trial.").
118. See Carol v. President and Comm'r of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 183 (1968)
(" An order issued in the area of First Amendment rights must be couched in the narrowest terms that will accomplish the pin-pointed objective permitted by the constitutional
mandate.").
119. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2723.
120. In re Shortridge, 34 P. 227, 229 (Cal. 1893).
121. Ex Parte Terry, 128·U.S. 289, 319 (1888). In contrast, a contemptuous act done
outside the presence of the court is called "constructive contempt." See id.
122. Morelli v. Superior Ct., 1 Cal. 3d 328, 388 (1969).
123. Id.
124. 370 U.S_ 230 (1962).
125. Id. at 234 (quoting In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224, 227 (1945».
126. Id.
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Two common tests used for balancing contemptuous statements against First Amendment rights are whether the statement constitutes: (1) "an imminent threat to the administration
of justice,"127 or (2) "a clear and present danger to the orderly
administration of justice."l28
D.

FIRST AMENDMENT FREE SPEECH RIGHTS OF ATTORNEYS

Jurisdictions differ as to the extent of First Amendment
free speech protections they afford attorneys. Two of the contexts courts have used to evaluate attorneys' free speech rights
are prior restraints on extrajudicial speech,129 and contempt citations for in-court statements. ISO However, prior to Zal, the
courts had not considered the possibility of a prior restraint on
an attorney's free speech rights in the courtroom. lSI
. In the contexts that have been considered, two different
views have emerged.
1. A Full' Protection View

One federal district court has held that "[l]itigation itself is
a form of expression protected by the First Amendment. It is
indisputable that attorneys and parties retain their First
Amendment rights even as participants in the judicial process."lS2 A New York state court has similarly declared that
"[t]he freedom of expression protection afforded by the First
Amendment ... unquestionably extends to the courtroom."188
127. See, e.g., Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 373 (1947); Bernard v. Gulf Oil Co., 619
F.2d 459, 474 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 449 U.S. 1033 (1980), and aff'd, 452 U.S. 89
(1981).
128. See, e.g., Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 254-55 (1941) ("The clear and
present danger doctrine requires a weighing of evidence and a determination of whether
the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a
clear and present. danger that they will bring about a substantial interference with the
orderly administration of justice."); Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 381 (1962); Estrada
v. Bailey, 563 F. Supp. 222, 223 (W.D. Tex 1983).
129. See supra notes 104-19 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 120-28 and accompanying text.
131. Zal argued that the trial court's in limine word-ban was a prior restraint on his
first amendment rights. Zal, 968 F.2d at 928.
132. In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 187 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (holding that an order prohibiting extrajudicial disclosure of discovery materials without giving reasons was deficient).
133. Frankel v. Roberts, 567 N.Y.S.2d 1018, 1020 (App. Div. 1991), appeal dis-
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Another state court has suggested that "[s]tatements made in
the presence of the court or outside the presence of the court are
protected by the guarantee of freedom of speech. "134
The Ninth Circuit case Hawk v. Cardoza 136 is an example of
how attorney free speech rights have been protected. There, the
court devised a test that balanced an attorney's First Amendment rights in the courtroom against the need for order in the
judicial process. 136 These holdings are consistent with the oft
used expression "attorneys do not lose their constitutional rights
at the courthouse door."137
2.

A Limited Protection View

Another line of cases has expressed that attorneys' rights
while participating in the trial process are limited. These limitations are usually based on the theory that lawyers are "officers of
the court" and thus can be regulated by less demanding
standards. 138
The recent Supreme Court case Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada 139 seems to follow the second line of cases. For litigants,
Gentile has modified the "courthouse door" expression:
missed, 582 N.E.2d 603 (N.Y. 1991) (upholding an attorney's first amendment right to
wear a "ready to strike" badge in a non-jury courtroom).
134. Garland v. State, 325 S.E.2d 131, 133 (Ga. 1985) (contempt citation for an extrajudicial statement to the press).
135. 575 F.2d 732 (9th Cir. 1978).
136. Id. at 735 (contempt case upheld contempt citations but warned that factors to
be considered in such cases included the length of trial, surrounding controversy, prior
warnings from the trial judge and prior conduct of the contemnor). The test used was
"grave danger to the administration of justice." Id.
137. Levine v. United States District Ct., 764 F.2d 590, 595 (9th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1158 (1986). See also Zal, 968 F.2d at 927; Halkin, 598 F.2d at 186.
138. See, e.g., State ex rei. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Porter, 766 I:'.2d 958, 968 (Okla:
1988); In re Hinds, 449 A.2d 483, 489 (N.J. 1982); Kuiper v. District Ct., 632 P.2d 694,
697 (Mont. 1981).
139. 111 S. Ct. 2720 (1991). In Gentile, an attorney gave a press conference hours
after his client was indicted on criminal charges. Id. at 2723. The Nevada State Bar filed
a complaint alleging that the attorney violated a Nevada Supreme Court rule prohibiting
an attorney from making an extrajudicial statement which would have "a substantial
likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding." Id. The Court found
that the Nevada Supreme Court rule was (1) void for vagueness as applied by the Nevada Supreme Court because its safe harbor provisions led the attorney to believe that
he could give a press conference without being disciplined, Id. at 2731, and (2) the "substantiallikelihood of material prejudice" test satisfied the first amendment. Id. at 2745.
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"[a]lthough litigants don't lose their First Amendment rights at
the courthouse door, those rights may be subordinated to other
interests that arise in this setting."14o For attorneys, Gentile
stated in dicta that "[a] lawyer's right to free speech is extremely circumscribed in the courtroom."141
Under Gentile, it is unclear which substantive standards the
United States Supreme Court would employ in analyzing an attorney's free speech rights in the courtroom today. Specifically,
the Gentile court held that attorneys' extra-judicial statements
could be regulated under the "less demanding" "substantial
likelihood of material prejudice" test employed by the Nevada
Supreme Court.142 The Court explained that adherence to the
precepts of the judicial system allowed attorney speech to be
regulated under a less demanding standard. 143 Accordingly, the
Court determined that the "less demanding" test was a "constitutionally permissible balance between the First Amendment
rights of attorneys in pending cases and the state's interest in
fair trials. "144
Although Gentile stated that attorney courtroom rights
were extremely circumscribed, it did not explicitly provide a different balancing test for those rights: However, Gentile did express that "blanket rules restricting speech of defense attorneys
should not be accepted without careful First Amendment scrutiny."1411 Thus, Gentile seems to provide some protection for attorney speech in the courtroom. Which substantive tests the
Court would employ is unknown.

140.
141.
142.
143.

[d. at 2744.
[d. at 2722.
[d. at 2744-45 (less demanding than the "clear and present danger" test).

Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2744 ("Lawyers representing clients in pending cases are
key participants in the criminal justice system, and the State may demand some adherence to the precepts of that system in regulating their speech as well as their conduct.").
144. [d. at 2745.
145. [d. at 2735.
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IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS

A.

THE MAJORITy146

1.

Jurisdiction

To grant jurisdiction, the court needed to address three issues.147 First, a habeas corpus petition generally becomes moot
after a prisoner is released from custody.148 Zal had already
served his contempt sentence and had been released from
prison. 149 However, the court noted that Robbins v. Christianson llSO recognized an exception to the mootness rule when the
prisoner could show that he would suffer collateral legal consequences if his conviction was allowed to stand.lII1 The court recognized that Zal could face discipline by the California State Bar
if his contempt citations were allowed to stand. I112 Thus, the
court found that Zal's habeas corpus petition was not moot. I113
Second, the court noted that habeas petitions could only be
granted for violations of the United States Constitution, federal
statutes or treaties. I114 The court focused on Zal's First Amendment claim and cited Levine v. District Court 155 in support of
its determination that Zal had constitutional rights in this situation. 156 Levine held that "attorneys ... do not lose their constitutional rights at the courthouse door."1117
146.
147.
(1992).
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Judge Farris wrote a one-justice majority opinion.
Zal v. Steppe, 968 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 121 L. Ed. 2d 582

[d. at 926 (citing Robbins v. Christianson, 904 F.2d 492, 494 (9th Cir. 1990».
[d.
904 F.2d 492 (9th Cir. 1990).
Zal, 968 F.2d at 926.
[d.
[d.
[d. at 926-27. 28 U.S.C. § 2554(a) (1974) provides:
The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas
corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody
in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States.
155. 764 F.2d 590 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1158 (1986).
156. Zal, 968 F.2d at 927.
157. Levine, 764 F.2d at 595.
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Third, although many jurisdictions have adopted the collateral bar rule, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that California
had explicitly elected not to follow that rule. l l!8 The court cited
In re Berry 1ll9 for this proposition and noted that, under Berry,
"a person, under California law, may disobey the order and raise
his jurisdictional contentions when he is sought to be punished. "160 And, under Berry, an order that is unconstitutional is
an order without jurisdiction. 16l
The court explained that while Berry was a California procedural standard that allowed Zal to present his constitutional
claim, the analysis was properly concluded using substantive
federal standards. 162
2.

The First Amendment Claim

The court first turned to Zal's First Amendment claim. 163
Zal argued that the trial court's in limine orders were prior restraints on his First Amendment free speech rights. 164 As prior
restraints, Zal claimed the orders had to be analyzed under the
"clear and present danger" standard. 161!
The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument. 166 It concluded
that the standards set forth in Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada 167
and Sacher v. United States 168 were appropriate to measure at158. Zal, 968 F.2d at 927. See supra notes 41-53 and accompanying text for an explanation of the collateral bar rule.
159. 436 P.2d 273 (Cal. 1968). See supra notes 54-63 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Berry.
160. Zal, 968 F.2d at 927 (citing Berry, 436 P.2d at 281).
161. [d.
162. [d. at 927 ("There is only one substantive standard - that prescribed by federal

law.").
163.
164.
165.
166.

[d.
Zal, 968 F.2d at 928.
[d.
[d. at 928.

167. III S. Ct. 2720 (1991). See supra note 139 for a discussion of Gentile.
168. 343 U.S. 1 (1952). In Sacher, an attorney was cited for contempt of court for
repeatedly provoking useless bickering and insulting the trial court judge during a long
trial. [d. at 4. Instead of issuing contempt citations at the time of the attorney's contemptuous behavior, the judge issued contempt citations at the end of the trial. [d. at 3.
The attorney did not dispute the fact that the judge could have properly held him in
contempt at the time his contemptuous behavior occurred, but he believed that, at the
time the trial had ended, the judge's summary contempt power had expired. [d. at 7.
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torneys' rights in the courtroom. leD Sacher expressed that the
zeal of counsel is important, but can disrupt the judicial process:
unless it is supervised and controlled by a neutral
judge representing the overriding social interest
in impartial justice. . . . Of course, it is the right
of counsel for every litigant to press his claim,
even if it appears farfetched and untenable, to obtain the court's considered ruling. Full enjoyment
of that right, with due allowance for the heat of
controversy, will be protected by appellate courts
when infringed by trial courts. But if the ruling
is adverse, it is not counsel's right to resist it or
to insult the judge - his right is only respectfully
to preserve his point for appeal. During trial,
lawyers must speak, each in his own time and
within his allowed time, and with relevance and
moderation. These are such obvious matters that
we should not remind the bar of them were it not
for the misconceptions manifest in this case.17O

Gentile reaffirmed Sacher's holding that if a ruling is adverse, counsel can only preserve the point for appeal. 171 Gentile
additionally determined that "lawyers representing clients in
pending cases could be regulated under a less demanding standard than the 'clear and present danger' test established for regulation of the press in Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart."172 Further, Gentile stated in dicta that "[i]t is unquestionable that in
the courtroom itself, during a judicial proceeding, whatever right
to 'free speech' an attorney has is extremely circumscribed."178
Using these guidelines from Sacher and Gentile, the Ninth
Circuit determined that the trial court's in limine orders did riot
violate Zal's First Amendment rights because they did not infringe on his right to preserve his or his clients' right to appeal.174 Additionally, the court noted that Zal could have propThe Court rejected the attorney's argument and held that summary contempt citations
can properly be issued after a trial has ended. [d. at 11.
169. Zal, 968 F.2d at 928.
170. [d. at 928 (quoting Sacher, 343 U.S. at 8-9) (emphasis in Zal).
171. Zal, 968 F.2d at 928 (citing Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2743).
172. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2744 (citing Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539,
543 (1976)).
173. Zal, 968 F.2d at 928 (quoting Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2743).
174. [d.
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erly filed for an interlocutory appeal after the in limine order
was issued. 1711
The court next addressed arguments presented in Judge
Noonan's dissent. Judge Noonan argued that the United States
Supreme Court case In re Little 176 applied First Amendment
protection to broad and even obscene· language in the courtroom. 177 In rejecting this argument, the court observed that Little was inapposite because it involved the violation of a general
contempt statute whereas Zal violated a specific court order. 178
The court also rejected Judge Noonan's "interpretation"179
of Sacher which required that an attorney "make impossible an
orderly and speedy discharge of the case" to be held in contempt. 180 The court declared that this requirement was a misinterpretation and reiterated that Sacher held that an attorney's
only right is to preserve his point for appeal. The court additionally noted that the holding in Sacher 181 was not altered by
Berry and its progeny.182 It explained that Berry "provides only
that a contempt citation is void if its underlying order is
unconstitutional. "188
Finally, the court rejected Judge Noonan's argument that
Zal should not be punished for questions that did not contain
words banned in the in limine order. 184 The court found that Zal
had intentionally violated the trial court's orders excluding defenses. 1811 It concluded that Zal "knew this" and therefore did
not raise an argument about non-included words in his briefs or
175. [d.

176. 404 U.S. 553 (1972) (per curiam). See infra note 218 for a discussion of Little.
177. Zal, 968 F.2d at 935.
178. [d.

179. Although Judge Noonan had pointed out that the defendant in Sacher did
whatever he could to make impossible a speedy and orderly dispatch of the case, he did
not appear to argue that Sacher was inapplicable because Zal had not acted similarly.
See Zal, 968 F.2d at 935. Nevertheless, the court interpreted Judge Noonan's discussion
of Sacher accordingly. [d. at 928.
180. [d. at 928.
181. Here the court additionally noted that the holding in Sacher was reaffirmed by
Gentile. [d.
182.
183.
184.
185.

[d.
[d.
[d. at 929.
[d.
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oral arguments. 186
In closing its First Amendment analysis, the court concluded: "[t]he only question before us is who controls the trial.
Under our current system, the trial judge is charged with preserving the decorum that permits a reasoned resolution of issues.
Zealous counsel cannot flout that authority behind the shield of
the First Amendment. We hold nothing more. "187
3. Zal's Other Claims

Zal also argued that the contempt citations issued against
him violated his clients' Sixth Amendment rights to trial by jury
and effective assistance of counsel, and his clients' Fourteenth
Amendment right to due process of law. 188 The court concluded
that Zal had standing to assert these claims because Zal had alleged "a personal injury fairly traceable to the defendants' allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief."18S
In addressing Zal's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment
claims, the court 'only analyzed the impact of the defenses which
were excluded in limine. ISO It determined that Zal's clients'
rights could not have been violated by defense exclusion unless
the court erred "as a matter of federal law" in excluding any of
the defenses. lSI The court held that Zal had no right to present
evidence simply to bring out his clients' 'reasons for their
actions. ls2
The only defense that the court analyzed individually was
the necessity defense. ISS It found that Zal's clients could not invoke the necessity defense ls4 because they were not seeking to
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

[d.

Zal, 968 F.2d at 929.
[d.
[d. (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984».

Zal, 968 F.2d at 929 ("[TJhe evidentiary orders did not violate Zal's clients'
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendnment rights unless the court erred ... in excluding those
defenses.").
191. [d.
192. [d.
193. See id.

194. According to the Ninth Circuit, the necessity defense requires that "(1) they
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avert a legally recognized harm.ls6 The court emphasized further
that Zal's clients had legal alternatives available to them that
did not involve violating the law. ISS These alternatives included
marching, distributing literature and telephone solicitation. ls7
Although Zal also presented constitutional claims on behalf
of the unborn, the court did not analyze them.19s Instead, it simply stated that it would address his non-First Amendment
claims "without deciding whether' a fetus has Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights."199 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit affirmed all of Zal's contempt citations. 20o
B. THE CONCURRENCE 20l

Judge Trott concurred with the majority opmlOn, but
wanted to expand on the First Amendment "right" of an attorney or his client to speak freely in the courtroom, and the Sixth
Amendment "right" to jury nullification202 of the law. 20s
1. -First Amendment Issues

Judge Trott rejected Zal's argument that attorneys retain
their First Amendment rights in the courtroom.204 He concluded
that the cases which provided that "attorneys ... do not lose
their constitutional rights at the courthouse door"206 were inapwere faced with a choice of evils and chose the lesser evil; (2) they acted to prevent
imminent harm; (3)' they reasonably anticipated a direct causal relationship between
their conduct and the harm to be averted; and (4) they had no legal alternatives to violating the law." Zal, 968 F.2d at 929 (citing United States v. Schoon, 955 F.2d 1238,
1239-40 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2980 (1992».
195. Zal, 968 F.2d at 929.
196. [d.
197. [d. (citing Northeast Women's Center v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342, 1350-52
(3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 901 (1989».
198. See Zal, 968 F.2d at 929.
199. [d.
200. [d. at 925.
201. Judge Trott authored a separate concurring opinion.
202. Jury nullification has been described by the United States Supreme Court as
"the naked power to return a verdict of 'not gUilty' even when acquittal is inconsistent
with the law given by the court." Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393-94 (1932).
203. Zal, 968 F.2d at 930.
204. Id. at 931.
. 205. See, e.g., Levine v. United States Dist. Ct., 764 F.2d 590, 595 (9th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1158 (1986); In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 187 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
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plicable, reasoning that those cases involved out-of-court communications with the media as opposed to courtroom speech. 206
Judge Trott" noted that attorneys have no independent First
Amendment rights in the courtroom but only have the rights derived from their clients' trial rights. 207 Judge Trott reiterated
that under Gentile and Sacher, an attorney's rights in a courtroom are "extremely circumscribed" and that an attorney could
only preserve his point for appeaP08 However, he suggested that
Gentile and Sacher were potentially misleading. 209 Although
they discussed attorneys' First Amendment rights, they were actually discussing the rights derived through clients which allowed attorneys to speak. 210 That, Judge Trott explained, "is
why Gentile uses quotation marks when it discusses a lawyer's
right to free speech."211 Accordingly, he concluded, under Sacher
and Gentile, an attorney's only First Amendment remedy when
faced with an adverse judicial order is his objection to the
order.212
Judge Trott further argued that traditional First Amendment analysis distinguishes between the types of forums in
which speakers seek to express their rights. 213 Judge Trott
206. Zal, 968 F.2d at 931.
207. [d. at 931-32.
208. [d. at 931.
209. [d.
210. [d.
211. Zal, 968 F.2d at 931.
212. [d.
213. [d. at 932. Traditional public forums include streets, parks and places which
"have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public, and ... have been used
for the purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing
public questions." Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939). In such
traditional public fora, the state has no right to exclude all speech and can only enforce
content-based exclusion of speech if the exclusion is narrowly drawn and serves a compelling state interest. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980). The second type of forum includes public property "which the State has opened for use by the public as a
place for expressive activity." Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460
U.S. 37, 45 (1983). This type of forum is called a "designated open forum" and is subject
to the same standards of first amendment regulation as a traditional public forum. [d. at
46. The third type of forum is the "non-public forum" which includes publicly-owned
facilities which have been "dedicated to use for either communicative or non-communicative purposes but have never been designated for indiscriminate expressive activity by
the general public." Gregoire v. Centennial Sch. Dist., 907 F.2d 1366, 1376 (3d Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 253 (1990) (citing United States Postal Servo v. Council of Greenburgh, 453 U.S. 114, 131 (1981». In this type of forum, the state may "reserve the forum
for its intended purposes, communicative or otherwise, as long as the regulation on
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pointed out that the courtroom was not technically a public forum.2U Although the courtroom met the "public forum" criteria
of being a place traditionally devoted to assembly and debate, it
never had been devoted to "free debate."m Traditionally, the
courtroom had only been 'open to debate within the confines set
by the trial judge and the law.216 Since Zal had no independent
free speech rights in the courtroom, and his clients had no right
to use words forbidden by the trial judge, neither was protected
by the First Amendment. 217
Concluding his First Amendment analysis, Judge Trott rejected Judge Noonan's assertion that broad and even obscene
language in the courtroom is constitutionally protected. 218 Judge
Trott determined that the case Judge Noonan cited for that proposition was inapplicable, reasoning that its decision was based
upon Fourteenth Amendment due process rights rather than
First Amendment free speech rights. 219
2.

Jury Nullification

Judge Trott also discussed Zal's Sixth Amendment jury trial
and assistance of counsel claims. 220 Zal had argued that his clients had a right to explain their actions (through Zal) to the
jury.221 Both Judge Trott and Judge Noonan found that each of
Zal's clients actually had been given one chance to explain why
they had blocked the abortion clinic doors.222 Although Judge
Trott noted that Zal's clients had been allowed to explain, he
disagreed with Judge Noonan's opinion that this explanation
speech is reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker's view." Greenburgh, 453 U.S. at 131.
214. Zal, 968 F.2d at 932.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 933.
218. Id. at 932.
219. Id. The case was In re Little, 404 U.S. 553 (1972), which reversed a summary
contempt conviction of a pro se defendant who had argued in closing that he was a
political prisoner and the trial court judge was biased against him. (He also called the
judge a 'M-_ F-_,' but that expletive was not part of the case). Zal, 968 F.2d at
932.
220. Id. at 930.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 930-31.
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was a "right."223
Judge Trott was convinced that an attorney has no right to
present evidence that is irrelevant to an element of a crime or a
legal defense. m He described the "right" to explain oneself to
the jury as the right to jury nullification.22Ci Further, he described jury nullification as an "illegitimate" and "fundamentally lawless" act. 226 Judge Trott asserted that "[i]f society
deems important certain 'explanations,' those explanations explicitly can become part of the law. But until then, we should
not allow litigants to slip through the back door when the front
door is locked. "227
C.

THE CONCURRENCE AND DISSENT228

Judge Noonan agreed that thirteen of Zal's contempt citations should be upheld, but he disagreed with the majority as to
the remaining seven citations. 229 Additionally, Judge Noonan
agreed with Judge Trott that Zal's First Amendment rights
should be measured by his clients' trial rights. 230 Further, he
agreed that jury nullification was not a right, but expressed that
Zal did have a right to explain his clients' actions.231 Finally,
Judge Noonan expressed that, under Berry, Zal had not acted
unprofessionally in defying the trial court's in limine orders.232
1.

Separating the Contempt Citations

Before addressing constitutional issues, Judge Noonan disagreed with the majority's view that Zal's questions presented
the excluded defenses. 233 In Judge Noonan's opinion, Zal only
violated the word-ban. 234 Thus, he stated that since Zal only ac223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

[d. at 930.
[d.
[d. See supra note 202 for a definition of jury nullification.
Zal, 968 F.2d at 930.
[d.

228. Judge Noonan concurred in the result in part and dissented in part.
229. Zal, 968 F.2d at 933.
230. [d. at 935.
231. [d. at 933.
232. [d. at 936.
233. Zal, 968 F.2d at 933.
234. [d.
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tually used banned words thirteen times, the other citations
should be reversed. 2311 If the trial court chose to form its in
limine motion in terms of specific words, Judge Noonan noted,
it should not be able to punish by analogy.238
2. First Amendment Issues

Judge Noonan's dissent neither measured nor determined
an attorney's own First Amendment rights, but concluded that
when Zal used the banned words, he was acting on behalf of his
clients.237 Therefore, Judge Noonan believed ZaI's First Amendment rights in this case should be measured by his client's
rights. 238
Citing In re Little 239 and Eaton u. City of Tulsa,240 Judge
Noonan stated that vehement and even obscene language in the
courtroom was traditionally protected by the First Amendment.241 The test used in those cases to determine whether
speech was constitutionally protected in the courtroom was the
"imminent threat to the administration of justice" test.242 Judge
Noonan observed that the test had upheld the constitutionality
of vehement words unconnected to the substance of a litigant's
case. He reasoned that it followed that language like ZaI's which
was connected to the case being tried would also be protected by
the First Amendment. 243
However, Judge Noonan conceded, the Gentile dicta which
"circumscribed" attorney speech was likely a standard the
United States Supreme Court would use today.24. Thus, Judge
Noonan agreed that the in limine order did not violate ZaI's
First Amendment rights because "[i]t was within the discretion
of the court to prevent what it thought to be unnecessary recur235. [d.
236. [d.
237. Zal, 968 F.2d at 935.
238. [d.
239. 404 U.S. 553 (1972). See supra note 219 for a discussion of Little.
240. 415 U.S. 697, 698 (1974) (reversing a defendant's contempt citation for use of
the phrase "chicken shit" during cross examination).
241. Zal, 968 F.2d at 935.
242. [d.
243. [d.
244. [d.
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rence to this [abortion] theme."241!
3. . Zal's Other Claims

Judge Noonan agreed with Judge Trott that jury nullification was not a right.24e However, he observed that Zal did have a
right to explain his clients' actions.247 The right to explain is essential to separating humans from subhumans even if such explanation does not present a legally recognized defense. 24s But,
Zal's clients were given one chance to explain. 249 So Judge Noonan conceded that Zal had to yield to the trial court judge's
order.2lio

4.

The Berry Rule

Judge Noonan argued that Zal had the right to violate the
in limine order and challenge the contempt citations. 21i1 In re
Berry21i2 states that, under California law, a contempt citation is
void if it is based on an unconstitutional court order.21!3 Further,
under California procedure, if an attorney is willing to take the
risk, he can ignore the void order and be vindicated. 2M Thus, the
holdings of Sacher and Gentile that an attorney's only right is
to preserve an issue for appeal do not contemplate a system like
that in California under Berry.21i1i Additionally, Judge Noonan
stated that Zal had reason to challenge the in limine orders as
245. Zal, 968 F.2d at 936.
246. Id. at 933.
247. Id. at 934. Judge Noonan explained:
As counsel for those accused of a crime, Zal had an obligation
to them to present their defense and to present it not halfheartedly, not mechanically, but zealously. . . . Zal, accordingly, had the right to bring out the reason for his clients' actions. Even if the reason ... did not constitute a good defense
under applicable law, an explanation allowed the jury to see
his clients not as monsters mindlessly invading the rights of
other[sj, but as human beings.
248. Id.
249. Zal, 968 F.2d at 934.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 935.
252. 436 P.2d 273 (Cal. 1968) (en banc).
253. Zal, 968 F.2d at 935 (citing Berry, 436 P.2d at 280).
254. Id.
255. Id. at 935.
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overbroad.2116 Under California law, Judge Noonan declared that
Zal did not act unprofessionally in resisting the in limine orders.2&? While Zal had a right to disobey those orders, Judge
Noonan conceded that Zal's constitutional challenges had
failed. 2118

v.

CRITIQUE

Zal's case raised the issue of whether, in an action for criminal trespass at an abortion clinic, an in limine ban of specific
words relating to, inter alia, abortion, was constitutionaPll9
While the Ninth Circuit held that the ban passed constitutional
muster, it failed to perform a thorough substantive analysis of
the ban itself.260 The court justified its limited analysis by relying on Sacher procedural guidelines that are inapplicable in California under Berry, and Gentile substantive guidelines which
are necessarily incomplete. 261
By sanctioning the use of in limine word-bans without providing guidelines for analyzing them, the court has opened the
door for unfettered judicial discretion. 262 Under Zal, there is no
need for judges to determine that banned words would be prejudicial or irrelevant in all possible contexts. In fact, under Zal,
judges are not required to provide any reason for excluding certain words. Zal thus effectively gives a trial judge complete discretion to censor attorney speech in the courtroom.
Undoubtedly, judges may need to exclude certain evidence
from trials to preserve both the rights of the parties and courtroom decorum. 268 However, since words are the tools of a trial .
attorney, unfettered censorship could prevent an attorney from
zealously advocating his client's case as well as encroach on an
attorney's own First Amendment rights. Zal has given trial
court judges a new and virtually unlimited power. Without
256.
257.
258.
259.
(1992).
260.
261.
262.
263.

[d. at 936.
[d.
[d.
Zal v. Steppe, 968 F.2d 924, 925 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 121 L. Ed. 2d 582
See
See
See
See

Zal, 968 F.2d at 927-29.
infra notes 264-77 and accompanying text.
infra notes 296-305 and accompanying text.
infra note 292 and accompanying text.
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guidelines for the use of this power, judicial discretion may become judicial abuse.
A.

IN RE BERRY - THE CALIFORNIA LAW?

Zal claimed that the in limine word-ban violated his First
Amendment free speech rights. 264 He filed a writ of habeas
corpus challenging the constitutionality of the trial court's m
limine word -ban. 2611 Zal had a right to do so under Berry. 266

Berry provides for a substantive constitutional analysis of a
court order after the order has been violated. 267 If the order is
unconstitutional, the contemnor's disobedience of that order will
be excused. 268 Thus, it is the underlying order, not the contemnor's defiance of the order, which must be analyzed. 269
The Ninth Circuit, however, failed to provide an in-depth
First Amendment analysis of the trial court's evidentiary orders.27o Instead, the Ninth Circuit analyzed Zal's reaction to the
orders, specifically, his behavior in court.271 The Ninth Circuit,
by relying on Sacher and Gentile, simply stated that Zal would
not be protected by the First Amendment 'if he disobeyed the
orders. 272 By using Sacher and Gentile in this manner, the court
effectively imposed the kind of "collateral bar" Berry forbids. 273
The court used Berry inconsistently in its opinion. It specifically cites Berry to exercise jurisdiction over Zal's claims.274 It
directly quotes language stating that a person may disobey a
court order and then challenge that order at the contempt pro264. Zal, 968 F.2d at 925.
265. [d.
266. See Berry, 436 P.2d at 279.
267. [d.
268. [d. at 281.
269. See Berry, 436 P.2d at 282.
270. S'ee Zal, 968 F.2d at 927-29.
271. [d.
272. [d. at 929 (UZealous counsel cannot flout that authority behind the shield of the
First Amendment.").
273. See Berry, 436 P.2d at 282.
274. Zal, 968 F.2d at 927 (U[Allthough a state may adopt the collateral bar rule, it
need not do so as a matter of federal law. Since California has explicitly elected not to do
so, see Berry, ... we can address the merits of Zal's First Amendment claim.").
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ceedings. 2711 However; in ruling on Zal's First Amendment claim,
the court ignored the Berry rule. Instead, it cited Sacher (a federal case) to hold that Zal's only right was to respectfully preserve his point for appeal. 276 This holding is wholly inconsistent
with California law under Berry.277 In fact, reconciling these two
rules would seem to be impossible.
B.

INAPPLICABILITY OF SACHER

The court relied on Sacher for the proposition that an attorney may not resist a court order but may only "respectfully
... preserve his point for appeal."278 Close analysis of Sacher
reveals that the challenge the attorney made in Sacher was
purely procedural: whether contempt citations could be issued
summarily.279 Zal's challenge, however, is a purely substantive
one. 280 As the portion of Sacher the Ninth Circuit relied upon
does not address substantive constitutional law, and its procedural analysis does not apply to attorneys who defy court orders
in California under Berry, it is inapplicable to Zal's challenge.

C.

GENTILE HAS LIMITED ApPLICABILITY

Gentile reiterated Sacher's inapplicable procedural rule
that a court ruling could not be resisted beyond the point necessary to preserve a claim for appeal.281 Additionally, Gentile determined that an attorney could be regulated under a less demanding standard than the clear and present danger test. 282
Finally, Gentile dicta stated that an attorney's free speech rights
275. [do
276. [do at 928.
277. See Berry, 436 P.2d at 281 ("[A] person, under California law, may disobey the
order and raise his jurisdictional contentions when he is sought to be punished for such
disobedience.") .
278. Zal, 968 F.2d at 928 (quoting Sacher, 343 U.S. at 9).
279. Sacher, 343 U.S. at 5-7 ("[T]he importance of clarifying the permissible practice [of how contempt citations can properly be issued] in such cases persuaded us to
grant certiorari, limited to one question of procedure on which there was disagreement in
the court below.").
. 280. Zal, 968 F.2d at 925 (Zal did not challenge any of the procedural methods used
by the trial court).
281. [do at 928.
282. [do
0
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in the courtroom were extremely circumscribed. 283
The Ninth Circuit's application of Gentile seems to lead to
the conclusion that attorneys are without constitutional rights in
the courtroom. However, Gentile, in fact, rejected arguments
that attorneys lacked constitutional rights as participants in the
judiciary process. 284 Substantively, Gentile warned against blanket rules restricting attorneys' First Amendment rights. 2811 Additionally, Gentile counseled that any rules restricting those rights
warrant careful analysis. 286 Specifically, Gentile held only that
the "substantial likelihood of material prejudice" standard properly balanced government interests and attorneys' First Amendment rights. 287
Although Gentile dicta states that attorneys' courtroom
rights are circumscribed, its holding and rationale lead to the
conclusion that attorneys are afforded some (albeit limited) First
Amendment protection in the courtroom.
D.

WHAT REMAINS AFTER SACHER AND GENTILE ARE OFFSET BY
BERRY

Sacher and Berry are polar opposites and cannot exist in
the same jurisdiction. Berry is the California rule and should
apply to all California cases. 288
After Sacher is eliminated from Gentile, Gentile can be reconciled with Berry. Berry requires a substantive analysis and
Gentile allows that analysis to be performed utilizing "less demanding" or even "extremely circumscribed" constitutional
standards. Since both Berry and Gentile provide for some substantive analysis, the court had a duty to perform this analysis.
As Gentile did not specifically provide a substantive test to
283. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2743.
284. [d. at 2726.
285. [d. at 2735.
286. [d. at 2726 ("[IJn cases raising First Amendment issues ... an appellate court
has an obligation to 'make an independent examination of the whole record' in order to
make sure that 'the judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of
free expression.' ").
287. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2745.
288. See Berry, 436 P.2d at 281-82.
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balance attorneys' free speech rights in the courtroom against
competing interests, the court had two options. It could have
adopted a test that regulated attorneys' speech in a different
context, such as Gentile's "less demanding" "substantial likelihood of material prejudice" test. 289 Alternatively, it could have
opted to devise its own balancing test. 290 Regardless of which
standard it selected, the court needed to apply the substantive
standard to the in limine orders themselves (not the defiance of
those orders).
Instead, the Zal court failed to perform even a minimal substantive analysis. By failing to adequately analyze the in ·limine
orders, the Ninth Circuit has effectively imposed an impermissible collateral bar on Zal's First Amendment claim. Furthermore,
by failing to analyze the word-ban, the Ninth Circuit has effectively sanctioned future bans without providing guidelines for
their use.
E.

THE IN LIMINE WORD-BAN

In Zal, the Ninth Circuit focused on the need to preserve
courtroom decorum in order to protect parties' trial rights. 291 Although the need to preserve courtroom decorum is undoubtedly
important,292 the Ninth Circuit's decision is problematic for two
reasons: (1) it failed to provide guidelines for granting or deny289. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2745.
290. See supra note 118 and accompanying text for some traditional factors considered in a balancing test.
291. See Zal, 968 F.2d at 929 ("The only question before us is who controls the trial.
Under our current system, the trial judge is charged with preserving the decorum that
permits a reasoned resolution of issues. Zealous counsel cannot flout that authority behind the shield of the First Amendment. We hold nothing more.") (emphasis original).
292. See Sacher, 343 U.S. at 8 ("[Sjtrife can pervert ... the judicial process unless
it is supervised and controlled by a neutral judge representing the overriding social interest in impartial justice with power to curb both adversaries."); United States v. Young,
470 U.S. 1, 10 (1985) ("We emphasize that the trial judge has the responsibility to maintain decorum in keeping with the nature of the proceeding; the judge is not a mere moderator, but is the governor of the trial for assuring its proper conduct."); Scott v. Anderson, 405 So.2d 228, 231 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) ("[Cjourts have continuously had the
authority and power to maintain order in their courtrooms and to assure litigants of a
fair trial."); People v. Pennisi, 563 N.Y.S.2d 612, 615 (Sup. Ct. 1990) ("[Tjhere is clearly
an inherent discretionary power in our courts to preserve order and decorum in our
courtrooms and in the pursuance of such power, to protect the rights of all parties and
witnesses and generally to further the administration of justice .... ").
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ing word-bans;293 and (2) it failed to perform a thorough constitutional analysis of such bans. 294 Because the Ninth Circuit
failed to express any sensitivity to the these issues, the decision
in Zal is troubling.
1.

The Potential for Abuse of Judicial Discretion

Trial court judges are given great discretion to determine
whether evidence should be excluded from trial. 2911 This discretion, however, is not unlimited. 296 Commentators emphasize that
the potential for abuse of discretion when excluding "irrelevant"297 or "prejudicial"298 evidence is particularly high. 299 When
293. The Zal court stated "the record does not contain the trial court's orders,
which apparently were made orally .... " Zal, 968 F.2d at 925. Since the court approved
the trial court's orders without any showing of findings that the banned words were prejudicial or irrelevant, it has implied that another court may do the same.
294. See Zal, 968 F.2d at 927-29.
295. See United States v. Kahn, 472 F.2d 272, 280 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 411
U.S. 982 (1973); Krist v. Eli Lilly & Co., 897 F.2d 293, 298 (7th Cir. 1990); Malave-Felix
v. Volvo Car Corp., 946 F.2d 967, 973 (1st Cir. 1991).
296. Korsak v. Atlas Hotels, Inc., 2 Cal. App. 4th 1516, 1523 (1992) ("[T)he discretion to admit or exclude evidence is not unlimited. The discretion of a trial judge is not a
whimsical, uncontrolled power, but a legal discretion which is subject to the limitations
of legal principles . . . .").
297. CAL. EVID. CODE § 210 (Deering 1986) describes relevant evidence as "evidence,
including evidence relevant to the credibility of a witness or hearsay declarant, having
any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to
the determination of the action." Id.
298. Arguably, CAL. EVID. CODE § 352 (Deering 1986) governs both prejudicial and
irrelevant evidence. It provides: "The court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a)
necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue
prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury." Id. Although the trial court
judge in Zal exercised his inherent power to issue orders in limine, the record suggests
that his decision was based on California Evidence Code sections 210 and 352. See supra
note 21 (the prosecutor asked that words be excluded in accordance with sections 210
and 352).
299. See Victor J. Gold, Limiting Judicial Discretion to Exclude Prejudicial Evidence, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 59, 61 (1984) ("Rule 403's grant of discretion has been
taken by the courts as license for an unprincipled, ad hoc approach to each case. Most
courts are content to conclude evidence has probative value or is unfairly prejudicial
without considering the meaning of those terms.") (Rule 403 is the federal equivalent to
CAL. PENAL CODE §352). One early state case discussed the problems inherent in judicial
discretion:
When the chancellor is bidden to exercise his discretion . . .
how is he to judge? Is he to make a law? Is he to formulate a
rule governing such cases? Then he becomes the legislature
. . . . And is one chancellor to make one rule and another
chancellor a different rule? Then we live under a government
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such discretion is not balanced against a duty to explain why the
judge acted as he or she did, a judge may fail to carefully consider the factors of each case,300 and may grant orders arbitrarily, aimlessly or reflexively.301 One commentator has explained
the situation of unbridled discretion as follows:
Unbridled discretion leads to unpredictability, inequality of treatment and the elevation of individual whim over principles validated by experience as well as by the popular will. The need to
limit discretion in the application of laws of evidence is particularly great. Leaving the resolution
of those issues to unrestrained discretion does not
simplify the law; it merely shrouds the law in a
cloud of arbitrariness. 802

Another commentator further argues that abuse of judicial discretion is rarely vindicated by appellate courts:
Some of the most conspicuous abuses of . . . discretion are to be found in appellate opinions. Too
often these opinions treat [the rule] as a grant of
unfettered discretion to the trial judge ... rather
than a rule requiring a careful balancing of factors so as to check discretion. 808

The possibility for abuse of discretion increases where wordbans are concerned. Judges are generally experienced in determining how physical or testamentary evidence can be used.
Thus, a judge can easily anticipate whether such evidence will
be irrelevant or prejudicial.
In contrast, mere words, taken out of context, have not traof men, not laws ....
Hubbard v. Hubbard, 58 A. 969, 970 (Vt. 1904).
300. See Victor J. Gold, Federal Rule of Evidence 403: Observations on the Nature
of Unfairly Prejudicial Evidence, 54 WASH. L. REV. 497, 500·01 (1983) ("[M)ost cases
utterly fail to conduct the required balancing test, or purporting to balance, give no hint
as to how or why a particular balance was struck. The appellate courts commonly excuse
these lapses on the grounds that Rule 403 grants courts discretion .... ").
301. See generally Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court,
Viewed from Above, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 635 (1971). A partial goal of the Rosenberg
article was to "help judges approach the problem of discretion reflectively and ... fully
in order to avoid using its power reflexively and aimlessly." [d. at 636.
302. Gold, supra note 300, at 500.
303. David P. Leonard, Appellate Review of Evidentiary Rulings, 70 N.C. L. REV.
1155, 1163 (1992).
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ditionally been viewed as "evidence."304 In most cases, a judge
would have difficulty anticipating how a specific word would be
used. For example, in Zal's case, it is unlikely that the trial
court judge considered all possible uses of the fifty excluded
words and phrases. Accordingly, it would be difficult to determine whether a word was "prejudicial" or "irrelevant" unless
the word was per se inflammatory, or lacked any legitimate use.
For example, some of the· phrases excluded in Zal, such as
"abortion," "fetus," and "unborn," were not per se inflammatory, and were clearly relevant to Zal's case. 3011 Thus, taken
together, the lack of guidelines governing word-bans and the difficulty of predicting how words will be used has increased potential for the abuse of judicial discretion.
2. How Potential Abuse in Granting In Limine Word-Bans
Could Conflict with Constitutional Rights

In a situation where a judge is exercising discretion with respect to an attorney's speech, an abuse of this discretion could
potentially abridge an attorney's First Amendment rights. Because this threat exists, a more exacting analysis than the Ninth
Circuit provided to analyze in limine word-bans should be
required. 306
Regardless of whether or not an in limine word-ban is technically a prior restraint, it is an order that restricts words before
they are spoken. 307 Accordingly, it is analogous to a. prior restraint and thus requires close scrutiny to insure that it does not
improperly intrude on First Amendment rights. 308
304. In fact, CAL. EVID. CODE § 140 (Deering 1986) describes evidence as "testimony,
writings, material objects, or other things presented to the senses that are offered to
prove the existence or nonexistence of a fact."
305. The trial court judge himself questioned potential jurors about their feelings on
abortion. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text. This leads to the conclusion
that the judge thought that abortion was a relevant subject.
306. See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 (1958) ("As cases decided by this
court have abundantly demonstrated, the line between speech unconditionally guaranteed and speech which may legitimately be regulated, suppressed, or punished is finely
drawn. The separation of legitimate from illegitimate speech calls for more sensitive
tools than California has supplied.") (citations omitted).
307. See supra notes 105-15 and accompanying. text for a definition and discussion
of prior restraints.
308. See In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1979). In discussing an order that
prohibited an attorney and his clients from disclosing information obtained through dis-
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The Ninth Circuit's failure to provide guidelines governing
the proper use of in limine word-bans effectively permits trial
court judges to censor attorney speech in the courtroom.80e Censorship is one of the areas that First Amendment doctrine most
clearly prohibits,810 and censoring specific words an attorney
may use in the courtroom is particularly dangerous. Specifically,
censorship in the courtroom may impair an attorney's ability to
zealously represent his or her client. 8ll An in limine word-ban
may thus run afoul of a client's Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel in addition to resulting in the suppression of an attorney's own First Amendment rights.
ZaPs own use of the words banned by the trial court judge
probably did not impair his clients' right to effective assistance
.of counsel. 812 Some of the banned words were arguably per se
covery, the Halkin court determined that the "fact that 'the order poses many of the
dangers of a prior restraint is sufficient to require close scrutiny of its impact on protected First Amendment expression." [d. at 186. See also MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER
ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH §4.04 (1984) (suggesting that one of the most important grounds
for distinguishing prior restraints from subsequent punishment is the difficulty of knowing in advance what a given individual will say, thus running the risk that constitutionally protected speech will be forbidden).
309. See Halkin. 598 F.2d at 185 n.18 ("A judicial order restraining speech casts the
judge in a role comparable to that of a censor."). Although most censorship cases involve
the censorship of obscenity, at least one commentator has noted that censorship is not
limited to that context. See Henry P. Monaghan, First Amendment Due Process, 83
HARV. L. REV. 518, 524 (1970) ("Nothing in the rationale of Freedman and its predecessors suggests that their principles are confined to the obscenity area."). Additionally, one
United States Supreme Court case has noted that judges themselves can censor in an
unconstitutional manner. Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308, 317 (1980)
("That a state trial judge might be thought more likely than an administrative censor to
determine accurately that a work is obscene does not change the unconstitutional character of the restraint if erroneously entered."). Further, another United States Supreme
Court case has suggested that the fact that a censor has control over the forum is additionally dangerous. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 553 (1975)
("[Tlhe danger of censorship and of abridgment of our precious First Amendment freedoms is too great where officials have unbridled discretion over a forum's use.").
310. See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 57 (1965) (suggesting that censorship
is "fraught with danger and viewed with suspicion").
311. See Gallagher v. Municipal Ct., 192 P.2d 905, 913 (Cal. 1948) ("Attorneys must
be given substantial freedom of expression in representing their clients.... An advocate
ought to be allowed freedom and latitude both in speech and in the conduct of his clients
case."); Weiss v. Burr, 484 F.2d 973, 980 (9th Cir. 1973) ("A court cannot deprive attorneys of their liberty or property in order to avert perceived threats to the administration
of justice if the court's action would unduly impair legitimate, nondisruptive advocacy.").
312. As one federal case counsels, "an attorney is not free to say literally anything
and everything imaginable in a courtroom under the pretext of protecting his client's
rights to a fair trial and fair representation." United States v. Cooper, 872 F.2d 1, 3 (1st
Cir. 1989).
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prejudicial. 313 For example, baby killing, murder, assassin are
particularly grapb.ic. Additionally, Zal used innocuous banned
words in a potentially inflammatory manner when he asked witnesses if they knew that babies were saved from abortions on
the day of the trespass, and whether a witness was an unborn
baby himself at some time. 314 Accordingly, the judge in Zal
could have held Zal in contempt for disorderly conduct. 311l Instead, Zal was cited for violating the in limine word-ban. 316
While the result (contempt) is the same in both cases, the fact
that the in limine ban was the reason Zal was cited sets a dangerous precedent.· The holding in Zal permits a judge to censor
potentially innocuous words.
For example, it is possible that Zal could have used banned
words in a manner that was neither irrelevant nor prejudicial.
Additionally, words used in this manner might be necessary to
effectively argue his clients' case. The word abortion provides
the best example. The judge himself inferred that the word was
relevant when he asked potential jurors if their feelings on that
subject would prevent them from being impartial. 317 To put tes~
timony into context, Zal could have asked a witness whether she
knew where the abortion clinic was, or why she was at the abortion clinic. Surely, these questions would not be prejudicial.
Although the power of the trial court judge to exercise discretion to "control" the courtroom serves important interests,
judges must be wary of exercising this discretion at the expense
of constitutional rights. 318 The Ninth Circuit did not express any
313. See supra note 21 for the full list of banned words.
314. Zal, 968 F.2d at 926. See supra note 25 for a list of the questions Zal asked
which contained banned words.
315. CAL. PENAL CODE § 166 (a) (Deering 1986) provides, in pertinent part, that a
person may be held in criminal contempt for engaging in courtroom behavior that is
"[d)isorderly, contemptuous, or insolent ... directly tending to interrupt its proceedings
or to impair the respect due to its authority."
316. Zal, 968 F.2d at 925 ("Zal ... challengers) his state court contempt citations for
violating the trial court's evidentiary orders."). See supra note 29 for relevant text from
the contempt citation.
.
317. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
318. See Baldwin v. Redwood City, 540 F.2d 1360, 1367 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
431 U.S. 913 (1977) ("[E)ven when pursuing a legitimate interest, a State may not choose
means that unnecessarily restrict constitutionally protected liberty."). A reasonable balance between the need for judicial control and an attorney's first amendment rights has
been counseled by two New York state courts as follows:
[W)hile it is the duty of a judge to preserve order and to in-
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sensitivity to the possibility of abuse of judicial discretion. It
failed to provide substantive guidelines to assist trial court
judges in deciding whether to grant in limine word-bans, and
thus effectively sanctioned unlimited discretion to censor attorney speech in the courtroom.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Zal v. Steppe,319 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit held that a defense attorney who violated an
in limine ban of specific words related to abortion could not
seek refuge in his First Amendment free speech rights. 320 By
concluding that the attorney was not protected by the First
Amendment in this circumstance, the Ninth Circuit was able to
avoid performing a· thorough analysis of the constitutionality of
the in limine word-ban itself. Consequently, the court has sanctioned word-bans without providing guidelines for when and
how they should be granted. By leaving trial court judges with
unfettered discretion to grant word-bans, Zal has effectively
given them a license to censor attorneys' speech in the
courtroom.
Kathleen K. McGinn*

sure that justice is not obstructed, it nevertheless follows that
any order or regulation imposed upon attorneys practicing
before him, must be based upon factual conditions which leave
no doubt that a continuance of the proscribed conduct will result in a disrespect for order and an impairment in the administration of justice. To this end, therefore, any such order or
rule must have a reasonable or plausible basis, else this discretionary power is subject to being declared arbitrarily
exercised.
Frankel v. Roberts, 567 N.Y.S.2d 1018, 1020 (App. Div. 1991) (quoting In re Peck v.
Stone, 304 N.Y.S.2d 881, 884 (App. Div. 1969».
319. Zal v. Steppe, 968 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1992),cert. denied, 121 L. Ed. 2d 582
(1992).
320. Id. at 929.
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